This paper studies the implications for the optimal policy of introducing an exogenous minimum wage into a standard public finance model. I present a dynamic general equilibrium model with a Ramsey planner deciding about public spending, labor income taxes and debt. I find that for sufficiently high minimum wages, equilibria in which the labor supply is rationed and involuntary unemployment arises may be optimal in bad times. For a minimum wage not too high, the government will set taxes to reduce the labor supply and avoid non desirable rationing. This implies increasing taxes in bad times. As regards the cyclical properties of the optimal policy, state contingent returns on debt are used as shock absorbers so as to smooth private consumption over time and across states of nature.
Introduction
In recent years a growing number of articles have postulated that there should be a role for fiscal policy in smoothing out distortions caused by non-competitive behavior of economic agents. Papers such as Judd (1997) , Guo and Lansing (1999) , Gorostiaga (2003) or SchmittGrohé and Uribe (2004a Uribe ( , 2004b ) study the optimal fiscal policy in worlds with imperfect competition and sticky prices.
This paper aims to contribute to this literature by analyzing the implications for the optimal policy of introducing an exogenous minimum wage into a standard public finance model. I want to study the extent to which the government is able to counteract the effects of distortions caused by the minimum wage. This work differs from the papers mentioned above in an important way: in their models all markets clear, while in my model the labor market may not clear in equilibrium. 1 I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model without capital. The economy is populated by consumers, firms and the government. The minimum wage assumption does not change firms' behavior in the labor market: they are always on their labor demand schedule. By contrast, a minimum wage law changes the formulation of the households' problem. If the statutory minimum wage is above the wage that equates labor demand and labor supply the short side of the market, i.e., labor demand, determines the labor allocation. Households perceive this quantity constraint. As a result, the budget constraint is no longer the only restriction they face when making decisions about consumption and leisure. Throughout the paper I refer to two concepts of labor supply: the notional and the effective labor supply. 2 The notional labor supply shows the amount of labor the consumer would like to sell if she were not constrained by the minimum wage; the effective labor supply shows the amount of labor she can actually sell given the demand-side restrictions.
The government is assumed to be a Ramsey planner that makes decisions on public spending, labor income tax rates and debt issues. In this economy the optimal policy is time inconsistent. However, since discussing time inconsistency issues is not the aim of this paper, I only consider the full-commitment solution. I assume that there is a technology through which the planner can commit itself to implementing in the future policies that are decided today.
One of the main results of the paper is that when the minimum wage is high, the optimal policy may imply a rationed labor supply during recessions. That is, allocations in which the worker is involuntarily unemployed may be found to be optimal. 3 By constrast, for relatively low minimum wages the planner should set labor income taxes so as to avoid rationing. As expected, welfare losses increase as the exogenous minimum wage rises. As regards the stabilizing properties of the optimal policy, my results agree with the previous literature. Debt is optimally used as a buffer stock. State contingent return on debt should change over the cycle to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature.
The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the theoretical framework underlying the analysis. Section 3 describes the simulation procedure and analyzes the results. Finally, section 4 concludes.
The model
I study a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. I consider a production economy with firms, infinitely-lived consumers, and a government. There is a private consumption good (c t ) and a public good (g t ) that satisfy
where y t is the aggregate production. The available production technology can be represented through a constant returns to scale concave production function:
where x t denotes leisure, t is land and θ t is a productivity shock following a Markov process:
This technology shock is the only source of uncertainty in the economy. I assume that there is an institution, say a union, that sets a minimum wage, w MIN , below which the firm cannot hire any labor. I do not model this institution's behavior. I simply consider that this minimum wage is exogenous and taken as given by all agents in the economy. Obviously, this minimum wage legislation imposes some restrictions on labor equilibrium allocations. When the wage rate that makes labor demand equal to labor supply is smaller than the minimum wage, w MIN , the minimum wage constraint will be binding.
At this wage, w MIN , labor services are in excess supply and the short side of the market, i.e., labor demand, determines the labor allocation. 4 
Firms
Firms maximize profits taking the input and output prices as given. Input inverse demands equal the corresponding marginal productivity, that is,
where f 1−x and f are the derivatives of the production function with respect to labor and land respectively.
Households
Consumers derive utility from private consumption, public spending and leisure. The household's preferences are given by the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function:
The function u is strictly increasing in the three arguments and strictly concave. The representative consumer is endowed with one unit of time which is devoted to work and leisure. She also owns units of land that will be inelastically supplied to the firm. The household can also lend to or borrow from the government with a full array of contingent one-period bonds that complete the markets. The consumer faces the following budget constraint:
where τ t is the income tax rate, w t the wage rate and p t the land price. p b t (θ) denotes the price the consumer has to pay in period t to get one unit of consumption good at t + 1 if the productivity shock realization is θ at this time and b t (θ) is the number of units of debt (contingent on θ) held in period t.
I assume that the consumer is a price taker in all the markets. The household's problem is to choose {c (6) subject to the temporal sequence of budget constraints (7) . Households are also aware of their inability to sell more labor than the quantity demanded at the minimum wage level w MIN . More precisely, workers perceive and take as given a quantity constraint, SC t , which binds their effective labor supply. I can write the households' program as follows:
Using the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, the first order conditions I find are:
where ν t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with inequality (8) . The worker also supplies her endowment of land inelastically. Finally, a transversality condition must also be fulfilled:
Government
The government provides the public good and funds her spending by labor income taxes and debt. At each period, the public sector faces the following budget constraint:
The government is assumed to be a Ramsey planner who takes into account agents' reaction to announced policies when she solves her maximization problem. In other words, the planner chooses the optimal policy among minimum-wage equilibrium allocations defined as: Definition 1: Given b −1 , w MIN and the productivity shock process {θ t }, a minimum-wage equilibrium is a stochastic process for prices {p b t (θ), w t , p t }, perceived constraints on the labor supply © SC t ª , allocations {c t , b t (θ), x t , t } and fiscal policy {g t , τ t , b t (θ)} such that:
i) {c t , b t (θ), x t , t } maximizes the consumer's objective function (6) subject to the budget constraints (7) and the restriction implied by © SC t ª , and taking as given {p t (θ), w t , p t } and {g t , τ t }.
ii) {x t , t } maximizes the firm's profits given {w t , p t }.
iii) The equilibrium wage w t is equal to or higher than the exogenous bound w MIN . And the constraint perceived by the labor supply at t, SC t , is equal to the labor demanded at the minimum wage, w MIN , in this period.
iv) The government budget constraint (13) and the economy's technology constraint (1) are satisfied at each period.
v) The land, consumption good and bonds markets clear.
Since the quantity constraint perceived by workers is equal, in equilibrium, to labor demanded by firms at wage w MIN , the household problem first order conditions (11) and the minimum wage restriction implied by point iii) in the definition above are, to some extent, redundant. It is easy to prove that the restrictions that labor supply conditions (10) and (11) , and the minimum wage legislation place on the set of minimum wage equilibrium allocations can be characterized by the two following inequalities:
The Ramsey planner problem, characterized as the maximization of the objective function (6) over the set of minimum-wage equilibria, is not a recursive problem.
Hence, traditional dynamic programming techniques cannot be adopted to solve the problem and the optimal policy will be time inconsistent. Previous papers have used different strategies to find recursive formulations. I adopt the approach proposed by Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991). It can be proved 7 that minimum-wage equilibrium allocations can be characterized by four conditions: the resource constraint (1), inequalities (14) and (15) and the so called implementability constraint,
By adopting this characterization, a recursive structure is recovered. The Lagrangian for the Ramsey problem can be then written as follows:
Taking derivatives with respect to leisure (x t ), government expenditure (g t ), and laborincome tax (τ t ) I get the first order conditions 9 7 A formal proposition and proof showing this type of characterization can be found in Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991, 1994) and Gorostiaga (2003) . 8 This equation is the result of substituting out prices in the government budget constraint using the first order conditions of the household's problem and the firm's problem. 9 where
If an optimal policy exists and the solution is interior, optimal allocations must satisfy these first order conditions together with the resource constraint (1) and the implementability constraint (16) . Additionally, applying the results of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, I find that the following equations also have to be fulfilled:
It can easily be proved that the only time-varying variable upon which the optimal allocations depend is the technology shock, θ. Therefore, I can conclude that the optimal policy at time t inherits the correlation properties of the contemporaneous productivity variable, θ t . And from period 0 onwards I can represent the endogenous variables by time-invariant functions of the technology shock, θ.
10
Conditions (17)- (18) are quite similar to those found in previous papers such as Lucas and Stokey (1983) . The other first order conditions (19)-(21) arise due to the possibility of finding rationed agents in the economy. It is worth explaining first, the main differences in the trade-offs faced by the planner in the model and in the framework which is standard in the literature, and secondly, the implications of the new expressions I find.
In this model, the policy maker encounters three different types of trade-offs when making decisions. Firstly, there is a trade-off between the benefits and the costs of larger government spending. Consumers derive utility from the publicly provided good, and higher welfare could therefore be achieved by increasing government expenses. On the cost side, this public good has to be financed through distorting taxes or through debt. These funding decisions involve another trade-off for the policy maker. Higher tax rates distort labor supply decisions. When maximizing welfare, the planner tries to avoid these distortions by using debt as a funding instrument. However, larger indebtedness today will generate higher debt obligations to be paid in the future through taxes. These two trade-offs are not new and appear in most of the papers of this literature.
However, in the economy another trade-off arises due to the minimum wage law and the possibility of involuntary unemployment. Since the economic welfare will be smaller if the consumer is constrained in the labor market, the government also tries to keep the economy away from this situation. In order to prevent non-desirable rationing schemes, the social planner can move the labor supply through taxation. Since larger taxes disincentive labor supply, a rationed labor force is less likely to be found. So high taxes can help to reduce distortions caused by minimum wages. But, as explained above, labor income taxes also distort economic decisions. Therefore, the government seeks a balance between these sources of distortion in order to attain as great a welfare as possible.
Keeping these trade-offs in mind, let us describe the behavior of the model. In good times, or more precisely when the technology shock is sufficiently high, the marginal productivity of labor is large and the firm is willing to pay a wage higher than the minimum wage, w MIN . Thus, labor demand is equal to labor supply and neither side of the labor market will be rationed in equilibrium. 11 However, when the economy slips into a recession, the technology shock is small and so is the marginal productivity of labor. The notional demand is not likely to be as high as the notional supply and the labor equilibrium allocation will be determined by the demand side of the market. In other words, the probability is that involuntary unemployment will arise in bad times. The government may raise welfare, avoiding involuntary unemployment. This could be done through policies that disincentive household labor supply. The planner could increase tax rates and shift the labor supply schedule up to the point it crosses the demand at w MIN . Then the equilibrium allocation will be such that none of the agents is constrained in the labor market. Actually, the effect of higher taxes is twofold. On the one hand, labor supply decreases because of the substitution effect. On the other hand, the income effect increases labor supply. For small increases in the labor tax rate, the substitution effect dominates the income effect. The numerical exercises I have performed show that when the minimum wage is not too high, welfare gains can be attained by increasing tax rates and reducing labor supply. When the minimum wage is high, the increase in tax rates required to get a substitution effect large enough to close the gap between supply and demand at w MIN is so large that the income effect is also huge. This income effect is actually higher than the substitution effect. There is no way in which involuntary unemployment could be avoided. 12 11 Equations (20)- (21) imply that δ t = 0 and µ t ≤ 0 in those periods in which the technology variable is high. 12 Alternatively, I might consider a policy combining taxes on labor income and subsidies to firms. In such a case, subsidies would shift the labor demand schedule upwards and taxes would discourage labor supply. As a result, smaller increases in tax rates would be necessary to make labor supply and labor demand equal at the minimum wage w MIN . However, notice that tax revenues are used to finance not only subsidies but also government spending. Therefore, the use of subsidies to firms does not guarantee that involuntary unemployment can be avoided.
Therefore, I expect to find that the constraint faced by the labor supply will be binding during these periods of economic weakness and optimal labor allocation will be equal to the quantity demanded by the firm, which is the short side of the market.
The set of first order conditions provides additional information. Let us consider a productivity shock realization such that the labor allocation is demand determined at time 0. Output in this period can be found simply by substituting the labor allocation into the technology equation (2) . Taking into account the resource constraint (1), the social planner only has to decide how much of the equilibrium output should be delivered as public services. And the government will choose the level of spending so as to equate the marginal utility of private and public consumption. Hence, in this period, the way used by the government to fund her expenses does not change the equilibrium allocations. As a result, the public sector can set higher taxes when the labor supply is constrained and reduce these taxes to zero in good times. By implementing this policy, the government will be able to reach the first best allocation during periods of economic prosperity. The equations above confirm this intuition: when the labor supply is constrained in period 0, the multiplier µ 0 is equal to zero and, according to equation (19) , the multiplier associated with the implementability constraint, λ, is also zero. And this makes µ t zero for all t. Additionally, when the economy soars, labor productivity is high and firms are willing to pay wages above the minimum wage, w MIN . Therefore, δ t will be zero as well. And the equations to be solved for the equilibrium allocations will be exactly those characterizing the first-best: the resource constraint (1), and the two conditions that equate the marginal rate of substitution between private and public consumption, and the marginal rate of substitution between private consumption and leisure with the corresponding marginal rate of transformation. Figure 1 presents a summary of the four cases that can arise under the rationing assumptions I have made. As described, depending upon the size of the minimum wage and the state of the technology, the labor allocation will be demand determined or such that the market clears; and constraints (14) and (15) will bind or will be fulfilled with strict inequality. 
Numerical results
I am interested in analyzing the extent to which the planner is able to smooth out the distortions due to the minimum wage. In this section, I first explain how the model is solved, and then describe the properties of the optimal decision rules.
Functional forms, parameterization and computational method
Closed form solutions are not available and I solve the model using numerical methods. I specify functional forms for both production function and preferences. I assume a CobbDouglas technology showing constant returns to scale:
and the following functional form for the preferences:
I set values for the parameters appearing in the model. The values I have chosen are 14 (β, α, σ 1 , σ 2 , γ, ρ, σ ε ) = (0.95, 0.8, 3, 2, 0.66, 0.95, 0.05).
13 I am considering a composite consumption index which includes both the privately and the publicly provided good. 14 The main findings are robust to changes in this parameterization.
I also specify a value for the minimum wage, w MIN . I have solved the model for different values around the unconstrained steady-state wage. This wage rate is computed to be 0.186. I will present the results for just two values of the minimum wage, 0.17 and 0.20, capturing a low and a high minimum wage respectively. In what follows, I will refer to the first figure as w LOW MIN and to the second one as w HIGH MIN . It should be noticed that this paper's aim is to study the ability of the government to counteract the effects on efficiency of minimum wage legislation rather than to match the observed data. That is why I do not calibrate the economy as well as possible to the data. 15 The procedure used to simulate the equilibrium paths for the endogenous variables combines techniques implemented in previous papers on optimal policies, such as Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), and the results of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem. Appendix A describes in detail computations performed.
Results
I present the results graphically by plotting the decision rules as functions of the technology shock, θ. It is important to notice that all the lines depicted in Figure 2 exhibit a kink at some value of the productivity shock. For realizations of the technology shock below this value, the minimum wage restriction is binding. Moreover, the kink moves to the right when w MIN is higher. That is, the higher the minimum wage the firm has to pay, the higher the productivity shock has to be in order for the labor demand not to be smaller than the notional labor supply.
Private consumption and government spending are larger when the economy soars. Similar behavior should be expected for these two variables given the role they play in the model and the functional forms I have assumed. When the technology variable is high, the larger amount of resources obtained are optimally devoted to increasing both private consumption and government spending.
The results I get for leisure are interesting because of the special properties of the labor market in the economy. Leisure decreases with the productivity variable in bad times but shows a positive reaction when the economy is booming. The possibility of finding labor demand determined equilibria when the technological variable is small explains the pattern I find for leisure. In recessions, the labor allocation is always equal to labor demand. Further increases in the technology variable imply a larger marginal productivity of labor and a larger labor demand which results in a larger portion of the time endowment being devoted to labor. Therefore, leisure will decrease with the productivity variable in periods when the minimum wage constraint binds. Conversely, when the economy is booming, the labor allocation is such that labor demand equals labor supply. Now, increases in the productivity of labor lead to equilibria with higher wages. Since the consumer derives utility from leisure, there will be a substitution effect and a wealth effect caused by the rise in wages. In the economy, the wealth effect is larger than the substitution effect in good times and the labor allocation will be smaller the higher the technology variable.
As regards the funding of government expenses, I study the properties of the two instruments available to the planner: taxes on labor income and state contingent debt. The results for labor income tax rates are different depending on the size of the minimum wage. For low minimum wages, when the economy slips into a recession the government sets taxes in order to reduce labor supply and avoid rationing in the labor market. Increases in the technology variable lead to states of nature in which lower tax rates are enough to equate labor supply and labor demand. In booms, when the minimum wage restriction does not bind, the larger tax base makes high tax rates be unnecessary to raise the optimal revenues. That is the reason why optimal taxes drop slightly with the technology variable in good times. Things are different when the minimum wage happens to be high. In that case, the planner finds it optimal to have a rationed labor supply in busts. It is not optimal to implement high tax rates to avoid rationing. As a result, the optimal taxes are much lower than those found for the high w MIN case. Here it is important to note that I can find multiple equilibrium solutions for the labor income tax satisfying the government intertemporal budget constraint. To some extent, I can say that a sort of Ricardian equivalence holds. Figure 2 shows one of these solutions for optimal taxes. In bad times, optimal allocations will be demand determined and, therefore, can be implemented no matter what the labor income tax rate is. Thus, the planner will set high enough taxes during recessions and will be able to reach the first best allocations by removing these labor taxes in good times. 16 As regards primary deficit, when the economy booms public spending should be higher and tax rates lower. Optimal tax revenues and public consumption are such that the deficit increases with the technology shock. 17 Papers such as Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1994) find it optimal to run deficits in bad times and surpluses in good times. It should be notice that, in essence, the policy strategy the model recommends is the same: the optimal policy involves running higher deficits the higher public expenditure is.
18 16 Note that multiple (optimal) solutions for taxes can be found for those periods when the minimum wage constraint binds and labor supply is constrained. However, it is always optimal to set zero taxes in periods when the technology variable is high and neither side of the labor market is constrained. 17 The behavior of the primary deficit over the cycle does not depend on the non-competitive labor market assumption. See Gorostiaga (2003) . 18 In their models, public expenditure is an exogenous variable and a recession is a period when that expenditure is high. Conversely, I assume that the government decides about public spending and that she State contingent debt plays a crucial role in the optimal policy. Contingent returns on debt are used as shock absorbers. Positive debt payments should partially compensate the negative effect that labor rationing and/or high taxes may have on labor income in bad times. Conversely, when the economy shows signs of recovery, optimal taxes on labor decrease and contingent debt payments should be negative, that is, it is the government who receives payments from households. Hence, an important attainment of the planner's policy is to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature.
Analysis of the volatility of the series computed confirms the suggestion that debt is used as buffer stock. Volatility of optimal taxes on labor income is relatively low: the standard deviation of this variable is 0.23 in the w LOW MIN case and 0.24 in the w HIGH MIN case. 19 The standard deviation of government spending is higher: 0.45 in the w LOW MIN case and 0.62 when w HIGH MIN is 0.2. And the fiscal variable that seems to be most volatile is contingent debt payments: 14.14 when the minimum wage is 0.17 and 15.8 when it is 0.2. This conclusion is also reached by most of the articles in the literature of optimal taxation.
Finally, this analysis also allows us to study the implications for welfare of changes in the minimum wage. A higher minimum wage increases distortions, which has adverse effects on the efficiency of the economy. If I compute the sum of discounted utilities when the minimum wage is 0.17 and when it is 0.2, I obtain a figure of -0.53 in the first case and -0.68 in the second. When the minimum wage is high, the scope for the government to be close to the first best is smaller. Leisure enjoyed by workers in recessions is high and the first best allocations are attained in good times. Nevertheless, this will not be enough to offset the large welfare losses caused by the highly distorting effect of high taxes and minimum wage laws.
Concluding remarks
This paper studies the implications for the optimal policy of introducing an exogenous minimum wage into a standard public finance model. I have found that involuntary unemployment and welfare losses arise caused by the assumption of an exogenous minimum wage legislation. Equilibria involving this kind of rationing are found to be optimal in recessions when the minimum wage considered is sufficiently high. For not so high minimum wages, taxes are optimally used to reduce the labor supply and keep the economy away from non desirable rationing schemes.
provides less public good during slumps, which in my model occur because there is a bad shock to the technology. 19 These standard deviations would be much lower if I only considered periods when the minimum wage constraint does not bind.
As expected, distortions are larger the higher the minimum wage and, therefore the scope for public policies to bring the economy close to the first best is smaller. As a result, welfare losses will increase with the minimum wage.
Additionally, I find that the planner should use debt as a buffer stock. State contingent return on debt will move over the cycle in order to smooth consumption over time and across states of nature.
Another contribution of the paper is a methodological one. The possibility of finding rationed workers adds occasionally binding constraints to the set of equations I solve to find the optimal solution. I compute numerically the government decision rules combining the techniques implemented in previous papers on optimal policies, such as Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1991), and the results of the Kuhn-Tucker theorem.
Finally, for the sake of simplicity in computations, the theoretical model is simple and abstracts from many issues I would like to include in a model meant to be used to derive economic policy recommendations. Among the extensions suggested by this study, I would like to point out two lines for future research. On the one hand, from the point of view of the public finance literature, removing the assumption of exogenous minimum wages and endogenizing this wage would be an interesting and valuable extension. It may be assumed that an agent of the economy, say the planner or a union, makes optimal decisions about this variable . On the other hand, this paper might be a step towards new research within the disequilibrium literature. Ideas analyzed in the 70s by the authors mentioned in the introduction can also be studied using the methodology of Real Business Cycle models.
Assuming a fixed value for T , I compute the optimal allocations for N different realizae tions of the shock following the procedure described above. Next, I average across these N realizations to approximate the expectation in the right-hand side of the implementability constraint. If this average is different from b −1 I change the proposed e T and iterate until the implementability constraint is satisfied. Convergence to a negative e T contradicts the assumption that µ t = 0, and leads to the following step.
Step 2: I proceed in a similar way to that presented in the previous step, but assuming that µ 0 < 0, and therefore, from (19) µ t < 0, for all t. Setting a fixed value for the Lagrange multiplier λ, I consider Case 3 in which the minimum wage constraint is binding, w t = w MIN , and δ t ≤ 0. I obtain an allocation (c t , x t , g t ) that solves the resource constraint (1) and the first order conditions (17)- (19) for this particular realization of the productivity shock.
21 I check whether the corresponding δ t is negative. If I obtain a positive multiplier, I conclude that I am not in Case 3 but in Case 4, that is, µ t ≤ 0 and δ t = 0. Substituting into the first order conditions, I get the equilibrium allocations of the endogenous variables. Repeating this procedure with N different realizations of the shock, I get the N equilibrium paths for the endogenous variables given these shock sequences. Again, I average across the N realizations to approximate the expectation in the right-hand side of the implementability constraint. If this average is different from b −1 I change the proposed λ and iterate until the implementability constraint is fulfilled.
